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INTRODUCTION
The correlation between real wages and aggregate employment growth has been
the object of several empirical studies conducted with both aggregate and micro data.
Despite the new availability of linked employer-employee data, however, we still have
limited empirical evidence [Belzil, 2000] to describe how real wage cyclicality can be
explained by what happens between workers and employers at the firm level. This
paper makes a contribution by making use of Italian data to explore whether a posi-
tive relationship between wage growth and employment growth is induced mainly by
an establishment effect or by an industry effect, at least as long as these effects are
measured in terms of employment changes.
As in the case of wage cyclicality studies, this research takes into account the
consequences that a composition effect can have on the factors that affect the employee
earnings in each establishment. When a firm is growing, as well as in the growth
phase of a cycle, new workers enter the job market. They are traditionally low-skill
employees or young people or previously “discouraged” workers. They earn low wages,
and so lower the average wage in the firm. This can explain the negative or insignifi-
cant correlation between real wages and employment level that has been found in
several studies conducted at the aggregate level. For the first time, this study tests
the existence of a composition bias with firm-level data where both employment and
wage growth can be measured for each establishment. Checking whether employ-
ment growth, within firms and within sectors, differently affects the change in the
firm’s average wage or the mean of the individual wage changes does this.
This research makes use of 1981-83 records for a sample of Italian firms. Informa-
tion about each establishment is combined with information about its employees. The
study explores cases in which firms are experiencing an employment decline, an employ-
ment increase, or no more than the national rate of labor turnover. The same analy-
sis is conducted for categories of workers that, within the same firm, differ because of
job qualifications or gender.
The paper is organized as follows: part 2 presents some of the theories concerning
the relationship between wage changes and employment growth. It also illustrates
the problem of a possible composition bias. Part 3 presents the empirical framework.
Part 4 describes the data set used for the estimations. Part 5 discusses the results.
The conclusions summarize the major findings.166 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS’ EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, WAGE
GROWTH, AND THE COMPOSITION EFFECT
As far as the relationship between levels of employment and real wages is con-
cerned, the early evidence collected by exploiting aggregate time series had indicated
acyclical, or very weak, pro cyclical real-wage behavior [Geary and Kennan, 1982].
This result has been criticized, however, by some more recent research that has
relied on individual longitudinal data and has suggested the existence of a positive,
significant correlation between real wages and aggregate employment levels [Abraham
and Haltiwanger, 1995].
This disagreement suggests the need to explore how this correlation grows out of
what happens at the establishment level. This evidence could then be used to infer the
validity of theories that changes in the level of employment and of real wages are not
due to shifts of the labor supply, but to shifts of the labor demand curve along a
positively sloped supply curve.
On one side, the human capital theory provides a framework in which wages can
increase with employment because of the higher pay that some workers will be able to
claim when their skills are scarce and in high demand. Employees can accumulate
some skills when they and/or their firm invest in their human capital. If these skills
are industry specific, the employees should be able to command a high alternative
wage. Then, the employer who wants to keep these workers and save in mobility costs
is left with the option of increasing their salaries. If this is the case, an empirical test
should show that changes in employees’ wages are explained by the changes in the
level of employment that occurs in sectors where worker expertise is required.
A positive relationship between wage changes and employment growth could also
be consistent with a different story that describes a power struggle within each firm.
Within the same human capital framework, this situation could be caused by the
monopsonistic power that some workers gain because of their accumulation of the
firm’s specific skills [Brown, 1989; Neal, 1998], although this explanation could prob-
ably explain the wage behaviors of only a few rare, skilled workers.
The predominant role of “inside” effects could also be predicted on the basis of
other theories that model how employees can capture some of the rents generated by
their expanding firm [Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991; Lindbeck and Snower,
2001]. The sociological models of the efficiency wage theory, for example, are consis-
tent with a situation in which an expanding firm may be willing to pay higher wages to
its employees to guarantee their cooperative behavior. On one side, the workers’
efforts can be positively related to the degree of fairness that they perceive in their
wage contracts both in terms of relative wage comparisons and in terms of their
entitlement to some of the firm’s profits. At the same time, the same employer can
value a cooperative environment because it affects directly, and indirectly through
the effect on profits, his utility function. This scenario can be the result of individual
bargaining as well as of wage levels achieved with the intervention of unions.
Models that describe how employees can gain from their firm’s increase in profit-
ability have been empirically tested.1 Blanchflower and Oswald [1988] and Levine [1992]
have shown that the firm’s productivity is a main determinant of wages, but research-
ers have differed in the choice of firm-performance measurement. Abowd, Kramarz,167 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
and Margolis [1999] have measured productivity in terms of real value added and real
sales per employee and found that high-wage firms are more productive per worker.
Nickell and Wadhwani [1990] have found a significant role for the output price and for
other measures of financial wealth, such as the deposit/current liabilities ratio and
the debt/equity ratio. In Hildreth and Oswald [1997], long-run changes in wages are
correlated with profit per employee. Brunello and Wadhwani [1989], Brown and Medoff
[1989], and Troske [1999] have stressed the importance of firm size as part of this set
of “inside” factors.
In the following analysis, I consider the expansion of a firm’s labor force as an
additional index of the firm’s economic performance. I test the relationship between
wage growth and employment growth to draw some additional insights on the validity
of rent-sharing models and of firm-specific human capital models, versus theories
stressing the importance of industry effects, that is, of the shortage of an industry’s
specific human capital. In particular, by comparing the effect of a labor force expan-
sion at the firm or industry level, I try to infer the relative power of “inside” versus
“outside” factors in wage determination.2 Moreover, by comparing the results between
expanding and declining firms, I explore to what extent this effect is symmetric across
“good” and “bad” times.3
This analysis runs into the same difficulty, however, that has generally character-
ized studies of real wage cyclicality: the potential composition bias first described by
Stockman [1983]. In fact, a study that relies just on aggregate measures of wage
changes risks drawing incorrect conclusions because of a statistical artifact. If the
labor force is heterogeneous and the groups that enter or exit the labor force during
expansions or depressions are not random, then the aggregate average wages will
reflect the presence of these different groups of workers. Indeed, lessons learned from
studies concerned with the decomposition of industry productivity [Haltiwanger, 1997;
Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992] imply that changes in industry aggregate real wages
can be driven by four different effects: changes in wages occurring within individual
firms, changes driven by the reallocation of employment shares between firms, changes
driven by the entry of workers, and changes driven by the exit of workers.
This same decomposition problem has to be considered when we study the behav-
ior of expanding and contracting single firms. As explained in Bils [1985], Solon, Barsky,
and Parker [1994], and Abraham and Haltiwanger [1995], the aggregate statistics of
wages are measured as the ratio of the total wage bill, Bt, to the total number of hours
Ht (or days, months) worked in the economy (or in the firm) in period t:
(1) Wt = (Bt / Ht) .
Therefore, the aggregate wage statistics, Wt, is a weighted average of the individual
wages wit:







where the weights are given by the share of working hours worked by each individual
(or group), i, during period t.  hit corresponds to the total hours worked by the indi-
vidual, and Ht represents the total amount of hours worked in the economy (or in the
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It is clear that the firm average wage could be affected by changes experienced by
current employees within the firm, such as increases in individual wages or internal
reallocation of workers between low and high paying jobs. At the same time, “outside”
factors leading to the entry or exit of groups of workers having specific characteristics
that affect wages will also lead to a different average level of real wages. If, during an
expansion, low-skilled people enter the labor market, this will have a countercyclical
effect on the average wage of the economy or, simply, a negative effect on the average
wage of the single establishment. At the same time, when a firm runs into a reces-
sion, it will usually dismiss employees who earn low wages: low-skilled workers, women,
and young people. If the magnitude of these external changes outweighs the role
played by within-firm changes in determining the firm’s average wages, then these
phenomena can lead to the incorrect conclusion that the firm’s aggregate wages are
inversely related to employment growth.
This study tries to correct for this composition bias to infer how wages respond to
the expansions and contractions of firms. It provides, for the first time, some evidence
about the magnitude of this bias in a study in which the average wage measures have
been calculated at the firm level. To do so, the analysis considers the firm as the unit
of observation, but also controls for the characteristics of the individuals employed in
each establishment. To check for the existence of a composition effect, it examines
the behavior of different measures of the mean wage growth as employment changes
within the firm and within the industry. The wage statistics are aggregated within
each establishment.
Once the results are corrected for this potential source of bias, the analysis can
examine how wages respond to changes in the level of employment. In particular, it
checks whether wage changes are explained mainly by an industry effect, or whether
they respond to changes in employment level at the firm level.
THE DATA
The data used in this study come from the archives of the Italian Social Security
Administration (Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale-INPS). This department
keeps records on all employed workers, with the exception of agricultural workers
and self-employed individuals.
Once a year, every Italian employer is required to submit to the INPS information
on the gross earnings of its employees and the total amount of time they worked for
him. These records are then used to estimate the total amount of money the firm will
have to pay both to the tax collection agency, on behalf of its employees, and to the
Social Security Administration, as contributions for the workers’ health insurance,
family allocations, and pension funds. These forms are thus comparable to a combina-
tion of a firm’s social security records and records of payroll deductions made to the
Internal Revenue Service in the United States.4
The data set used for this study was constructed with records of firms that had
been randomly sampled from the archives of Turin, Italy, over the 1981-83 period.
Turin is situated in the northern part of the country and is one of the most industrial-
ized cities in Italy. This city was one of the main destinations for the large flow of
migrants who moved from the South to the North during the 1950s and 1960s. The169 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
flow of migrants was mainly induced by the presence of FIAT, the largest Italian car
manufacturer, which generated a very large number of other industrial activities.
The heavy concentration of both large and small firms in this city explains its role as
the main center for changes in industrial relations in 1981, 1982, and 1983. This role
became especially evident during the years of this study, 1981, 1982, and 1983, which
represent a crucial period in the evolution of Italy’s labor relations and labor regula-
tions. The years 1975-79 had been a period of high union power. Unions had pressured
the government to introduce solidarity policies that drastically reduced wage differen-
tials. These policies produced a clash of interests between low-skill and high-skill
employees, however. This resulted in a deep fracture within the union movement.
After the period of compression of skill differential, the years 1980-85 were character-
ized by stable or declining real wages; increases in productivity, profits, and working
hours; and a decline in absenteeism and employment.
The main characteristic of this data set is that it combines information about the
firms and about all the employees who were working in them. The individual financial
records include annual earnings and the calendar months during which the employee
received at least some remuneration.  To calculate real monthly wages, the nominal
values of wages were deflated by using the national CPI. The sampling procedures,
and the criteria used to construct a preliminary data set, are described in detail in
Galizzi and Lang [1998].
The data set includes records for all the workers for whom observations were
available except for ones deleted because of inconsistency in some records (about
gender, age, etc.). The data also exclude records concerning workers suspected to be
employed under the CIG, the Italian unemployment insurance system. In fact, although
it is possible to tell if workers are still under contract and whether they are being paid,
the Italian unemployment compensation scheme complicates the detection of separa-
tions. Under the “Cassa Integrazione Guadagni” (CIG), workers received 80 percent of
their wages from the government (they were paid through the Social Security Sys-
tem). The CIG was very popular during the period spanned by the data set (1981-83).
In the industrial sector, the percentage of employees in CIG went from 2.7 percent in
1980 to 9.9 percent in 1984 [Barca and Magnani, 1989, 67]. There is some uncertainty
about the way these cases were recorded in the original Social Security data, how-
ever, and the original data set was reduced by 6.81 percent after deletion of cases of
suspected CIG.5
This new sample contained a total of 1,274 firms employing 24,808 individuals.
Workers’ records were used to calculate firms’ average wages and average workers
characteristics, as well as the average wages for each gender and skill level within
each firm and each two-digit industrial sector. The total number of firms was further
reduced to include only the 1,130 establishments for which it was possible to calculate
the value of real monthly wage changes and of employment growth over at least two
years. More specifically, 1,034 firms had records over three consecutive years (1981,
1982, and 1983), and 96 firms had records only over two consecutive years. The final
firms unbalanced panel data set was then made out of 3,294 yearly observations.
Table 1 presents some preliminary descriptive statistics for the original sample.
It shows that this sample is composed mainly of very small establishments. Eighty-
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econometric analysis will show, I have chosen this size as a threshold to conduct the
estimations on separate groups of firms because of the different meaning that a given
rate of employment growth can have in a very small establishment or in a medium to
large establishment. Moreover, if a firm had fewer than 16 employees, Italian employ-
ers were exempt from following the labor laws.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Turin, Italy
All Firms Size > 15
(n = 3,294) (n = 427)
Variables Mean Sdt. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ln (Firm’s Average Wt) 6.35 0.39 6.76 0.51
Ln (Firm’s Average Wt) – Ln (Firm’s Av. Wt–1) 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.08
Σ (Ln (wi)) / n 6.33 0.41 6.60 0.36
Σ [Ln (wit)] /n – Σ [Ln (wit-1)] /n 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.12
Σ [Ln (wit/wit–1)]/n 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.05
Ln (Firm’s Employmentt) – Ln (Firm’s Emp.t–1) –0.06 0.47 –0.05 0.23
Ln (Industry’s Emp.t) – Ln (Industry’s Emp.t–1) –0.01 0.30 –0.02 0.04
Size of the Firm 16.03 66.44 94.17 164.07
Average Age of Firm’s Employees 29.75 9.07 35.86 5.21
% Men 0.67 0.38 0.75 0.24
% Trainees 0.15 0.29 0.01 0.04
% Blue-Collar Workers 0.53 0.39 0.66 0.27
% White-Collar Workers 0.30 0.37 0.28 0.26
% Managers 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.11
% Home Workers 0.001 0.02 0.003 0.03
% Changes in Skill Level 0.19 0.27 0.10 0.09
Dummy for year = 1983 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.45
The descriptive statistics also show the changes that occur in the data set when
we go from the sample containing very small establishments to the one that just
includes establishments with more than 15 employees over two consecutive years.  In
this case, on average, the employees are older (the average age of the firm’s workers
rises from 30 to 36 years), firms employ a larger percentage of male workers (the
percentage rises from 67 to 75 percent), and different percentages of individuals are in
different, mainly higher, skill qualification groups (the percentages go from 15  to 1
percent of trainees, from 53 to 66 percent blue collar, from 30 to 28 percent white
collar, and from 1 to 3 percent managers).
Finally, these data reflect the previously mentioned years of deep recession for
the Italian economy. The level of employment in the Italian manufacturing sectors
had fallen by 0.4 percent between 1979 and 1980, by 2.9 percent between 1981 and
1982, by 4.5 percent between 1982 and 1983, and by 1.1 percent between 1984 and
1985.  The recovery started only in 1985 [Barca and Magnani, 1989, 35]. This situation
is reflected in the data set, where the mean employment growth rate for the three
years was -0.06 for the entire sample and -0.05 for the establishments with more than
15 employees.171 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
The limited number of firms experiencing employment growth complicates the
interpretation of this analysis, which tries to detect possible different relationships
between wages and employment growth among expanding and declining firms. In
addition to the estimations conducted for firms that experienced employment growth
greater or smaller than zero, therefore, I also tried to check the consistency of some
results by looking at firms in which employment grew by at least -5 percent over two
consecutive years.6
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The model that I estimate to study how real wages respond to the expansion and
contraction of firms originates from a general specification of the log wage equation.
Because my unit of observation is the single firm, I want to define a firm’s mean wage
equation, and I derive it from an individual wage equation.
For an individual i employed at time t, the real wage equation can usually be
described as a function of personal (individual specific, xi, and time varying, xit) char-
acteristics, as a function of the level of the firm’s economic activity, Y (measured by
the level of employment in the establishment), and as a function of the alternative job
opportunities the individual could have (measured by Z, the level of employment of
the industry for which he/she has desirable skills).  Therefore:
(3) ln wit = β0t + xiβ1 + xitβ2 + Ytβ3 + Ztβ4 + εit
and the error term can be decomposed as
(4) εit = αi + λit + µt ,
where αi is the individual-specific effect, λit is the error component that varies over
individuals and time, and µt is the time-specific effect. Then, taking the first-differences
eliminates both the individual-specific regressor xi and the individual “fixed-effect”
error component, αi:
(5) ln (wit / wit–1) = (β0t – β0t–1) + (xit – xit–1) β2
+ (Yt – Yt–1) β3 + (Zt – Zt–1) β4 + (λit – λit–1) + (µt – µt–1) .
If a data set provides only information about aggregate statistics, such as the wage
bill and the level of employment of different establishments, then it is only possible to
reproduce the individual wage equations in terms of log of the mean level of real
wages. In this situation, if I call Wj the mean level of real wages in each establishment
j, I am just able to estimate:
(6) ln (Wjt) = α0t + Yjtα1 + Ztα2 + θjt
and the change of the firm’s mean level of wages becomes:
(7) ln (Wjt / Wjt–1) = (α0t – α0t–1) + (Yjt – Yjt–1)α1 + (Zt – Zt–1)α2 + (θjt – θjt–1) ,
where the term (θjt – θjt–1) just contains the firm’s time-specific effect and the time-
specific effect of the error term.172 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In the case of this study, however, the data set also provides information about
the nt individual workers who were employed in each firm j in different time periods t.
I can therefore derive the following specification of the firm’s aggregate value of wages
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represents the firm’s mean value of xij, the individual-specific variables that are fixed
over time, while Xjt corresponds to the firm’s average values of the regressors xijt that
vary both over time and individuals. Here, Yjt and Zjt indicate the level of employment
of the establishment j and of its industry. The last term, θjt, is the average of the error
terms of the individual log wage equations by firm and can be decomposed as:


















It is important to note that the aggregation of logarithmic individual wage equations
in Equation (8) produces a geometric firm average wage, and therefore a value that
differs in nature from the arithmetic average wage displayed in Equations (6) and (7).7
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where the two terms containing the differences of the average values of the x regres-
sors indicate how a change in the mean value of some of the employees’ characteris-
tics and potential entry and exit of workers affects the growth rate of the firm’s mean
wage. These are the terms that could induce a composition bias and, therefore, a
different estimated effect of employment growth on wage growth, once aggregate
wages, instead of individual wages, are considered.173 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
To eliminate this bias, I construct a new measure of the firm’s aggregate wage
growth that consists in the mean of the individual wage changes experienced only by
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This new aggregate statistic is still a function of the changes of the time-specific
characteristics of each individual and of the statistics that measure the variations in
the firm’s and industry’s employment level; however, this new measure of wage changes
only captures effects within the firms. In this last model, the effect of employment
growth on wage growth is no longer biased by the changes that can occur in the mean
characteristics of the firm’s employees when workers enter or exit the firm.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The aim of this paper is to cast some light on the relative power of firms’ and
industries’ effects that can induce a positive correlation between real wages and employ-
ment growth. The following results are derived from the estimations of the different
models described in Equations (7), (9), and (10) and that relate real wage growth with
the changes in employment level both at the establishment level and the industry
level.
A first step is to detect the magnitude of the composition bias that occurs when
different aggregate measures of employment growth are used. After correcting for
such a bias, I estimate to what extent wages respond to employment changes in firms
of different sizes (for all the firms that are contained in the data set and for those that
reported more than 15 employees over two consecutive years). I then compare the
different results for expanding and declining firms, and for firms that experienced no
more than the national rate of turnover (–0.05 percent).8
Because this data set consists of unbalanced panel data, the estimations are con-
ducted with robust standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and cor-
relation of the error terms across firms and across years.
The Effect of Composition Bias
Tables 2 and 3 present different estimations of wage growth models in which the
aggregate measure of wage changes has been calculated using different procedures.
The two tables refer to two different samples: the first contains all the establishments
and the second contains only firms with more than 15 employees over two consecutive174 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
years. All model specifications include a variable that indicates whether the changes
are measured for the 1982-83 period.
TABLE 2
Estimations of Firms’ Aggregate Wage Growth for All Firms
Dependent Variable: Ln(Wt) Σ[Ln(wit)]/nt Σ[Ln (wit/wit–1]/n
– Ln(Wt–1)–   Σ[Ln(wit–1)]/nt–1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.10
(6.1) (4.9) (9.9) (8.2) (5.8) (10.6)
Ln (Firm’s Employmentt) –0.05 –0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
–Ln (Firm’s Employmentt–1) (–2.9) (–4.0) (3.8) (3.4) (3.2) (3.2)
Ln (Industry’s Employmentt) –0.002 –0.01 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 —
–Ln (Industry’s Employmentt–1) (–0.1) (–0.4) (–1.2) (–0.9) (–0.9)
Dummy for year = 1983 –0.03 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 —
(–2.8) (–2.9) (–2.4) (–2.1) (–2.2)
(Average Aget of Firm’s — — — –0.20 –0.19 –0.19
Employees) /100 (–5.8) (–5.5) (–6.4)
Industry Dummies — — — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies x Year — — — — — Yes
(Average Aget Employees) — 0.01 ————
–  (Average Aget–1 Employees) (0.95)
(Average Aget of Employees)2 — –0.00 ————
–  (Average Aget–1 Employees)2 (–0.5)
(% Male Employeest) — 0.20 ————
– (% Male Employeest–1) (3.63)
(% Traineest) — 0.26 ————
– (% Traineest–1) (2.7)
(% Blue Collart) — 0.35 ————
– (% Blue Collart–1) (4.0)
(% White Collart) — 0.51 ————
– (% White Collart–1) (4.9)
(% Managerst) — 1.22 ————
– (% Managerst–1) (6.5)
Number of observations 2,132 2,132 2,023a 2,023a 2,023a 2,053a
Note: The estimations that are presented in this and in the following tables have been conducted with
robust standard errors corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and correlation of the error terms
across firms and across years. t-statistics are in parentheses.
a. The smaller number of observations is due to the existence of very small establishments in which all
employees changed from year to year and for whom it was therefore impossible to calculate the
dependent variable. Also, the different sample sizes across model specifications (5) and (6) are the
consequence of the lack of observations for the industry’s employment in industry 51.175 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
TABLE 3
Estimations of Firms’ Aggregate Wage Growth for
Firms with more than 15 Employees
Dependent Variable: Ln(Wt) Σ[Ln(wit)]/nt Σ[Ln (wit/wit–1]/n
– Ln(Wt–1)–   Σ[Ln(wit–1)]/nt–1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.05
(1.1) (1.5) (1.4) (4.0) (2.1) (2.0)
Ln (Firm’s Employmentt) –0.06 –0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
–Ln (Firm’s Employmentt–1) (–1.3) (–0.6) (3.3) (3.3) (3.5) (3.7)
Ln (Industry’s Employmentt) –0.07 –0.01 0.09 0.09 –0.10 —
–Ln (Industry’s Employmentt–1) (0.6) (–0.1) (1.5) (1.5) (–1.6)
Dummy for year = 1983 –0.004 –0.02 0.001 0.002 0.003 —
(–0.3) (–1.2) (0.2) (0.4) (–0.5)
(Average Aget of Firm’s — — — –0.23 –0.16 –0.17
Employees) /100 (–3.8) (–2.1) (–2.2)
Industry Dummies — — — — Yes Yes
Industry Dummies x Year — — — — — Yes
(Average Aget Employees) — 0.08 ————
–  (Average Aget–1 Employees) (1.40)
(Average Aget of Employees)2 — –0.001 ————
–  (Average Aget–1 Employees)2 (–1.4)
(% Male Employeest) — 0.30 ————
– (% Male Employeest–1) (1.60)
(% Traineest) — –0.35 ————
– (% Traineest–1) (–0.3)
(% Blue Collart) — –0.30 ————
– (% Blue Collart–1) (–0.3)
(% White Collart) — 0.06 ————
– (% White Collart–1) (0.06)
(% Managerst) — 0.46 ————
– (% Managerst–1) (0.4)
Number of observations 259 259 259 259 259a 265a
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
a. The different sample sizes across model specifications (5) and (6) are the consequence of the lack of
observations for the industry’s employment in industry 51.
Columns 1 and 2 in Tables 2 and 3 present the results the study would produce if
I did not account for a possible composition bias. Column 1 presents the results the
study would produce if I had only observations about the wage bill and the level of
employment for each establishment and industry in our sample. In this case, the
dependent variable would be the rate of growth of the firm’s arithmetic average wage.
This case is presented to resemble the type of relation that has usually been esti-
mated in studies that have dealt with the issue of wage cyclicality by using aggregate
statistics. This first regression suggests a negative relationship between wage growth
and employment changes.
A similar result is derived by the second estimation described in Column 2. Here,
the average wage growth rate is estimated for each firm by exploiting the information176 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
about the individual workers’ Log (wage) equations and is calculated as the difference
between two geometric averages. This regression contains both information about
the change in the level of employment both by firm and by industry and information
about the employees who were working at each firm.9 In particular, I include informa-
tion about the age, gender, and skill level of the employees. The choice of these regres-
sors is justified by the theoretical and empirical literature that has shown that age is
positively related to the level of labor earnings, but also negatively affects the rate of
growth of wages. At the same time, career patterns, and therefore the changes in
wages, are known to differ among male and female employees.
By taking the average of the individual Log (wage) equation (that is quadratic in
age and that includes the workers’ skill qualifications among the regressors), I obtain
the following specification for the model presented in Equation (9) to describe the rate
of growth of the average wage in each firm j:
(11)
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This is the specification presented in column 2 of Tables 2 and 3. As in the case of
the estimation in column 1, and of the studies that have dealt with the issue of wage
cyclicality by making use of only aggregate data, this model specification suggests a
negative relationship between wage growth and employment changes. Furthermore,
as expected, firms with an increasing percentage of male workers register a larger
average wage growth. This result is consistent with the generally accepted evidence
that men usually command higher wages. It is also not surprising that this effect is
more significant for the larger sample including the smaller firms (Table 2, column 2
versus Table 3, column 2), given that these smaller establishments employ a larger
percentage of female workers, as shown by the descriptive analysis. It also seems
reasonable that the coefficients of changes in the fraction of different skill-level groups
increase in magnitude according to a hierarchic order. But this last effect is insignifi-
cant for all the skill qualification groups when I just consider the sample with larger
firms (Table 3, column 2). For this same set of firms, the effect of the average age of
employees, together with its quadratic value, has a stronger, but still not very signifi-
cant, effect. This seems to indicate that tenure considerations play a larger role within
the larger firms. This result is quite consistent with the hypothesis that small firms
represent a temporary work experience for most employees.
All these available regressors can only very imperfectly capture some important
factors, such as tenure and ability, which have been proven to have a strong influence
on individual wage growth. Therefore, this estimation is probably still affected by a
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To correct for such a bias, I present the estimations of columns 3 and 4 (Tables 2
and 3). Here, the dependent variable is still an aggregate measure, but it has been
constructed by averaging the individual wage changes within each firm. A first speci-
fication, including just the changes in employment levels and the dummy for year
(column 3), is once again expanded to include the average employee age in each estab-
lishment.10 The presence of this regressor is justified on the assumption of a quadratic
relationship between age and earnings. Then, according to what was presented in the
model of Equation (10), I can write:
(12)
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This new set of results (columns 3 and 4 in Tables 2 and 3) shows clearly that very
different conclusions can be drawn when an analysis explicitly accounts for the change
in the labor force composition that occurs within each firm j as employment changes.
In fact, once I present a “correct” average measure of the firms’ wage changes, I
reverse the previous findings as far as the adverse effect of employment on earnings is
concerned. This last estimation of the mean of individual wage changes suggests that
firms’ employment growth and wage growth are positively and strongly related. At
the same time, the industry effect, measured by the change in the sector’s employ-
ment, is completely insignificant.11 This finding is still valid for the category of larger
firms (the estimations are presented in Table 3).
To test further for the role of additional industry effects, I then estimate two
additional similar models (columns 5 and 6 in Tables 2 and 3), in which I first add the
industry dummies and then consider the interactive effect of these dummies with the
one indicating the year to which the observations refer. Columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2
and 3 show that the establishment effect is still one of the largest and most significant
regressors in the “corrected” aggregate wage growth model, while the coefficient of
the industry’s employment growth remains insignificant. At the same time, a joint
significance test conducted on the industry dummies permits me to reject the null
hypothesis that their coefficients are simultaneously zero. This same result was also
confirmed in the model specification including the interactive effect of the industry
dummies with the year.
This evidence contradicts those models that explain a positive relationship between
wage changes and employment growth as the result of the shortage of industry-specific
human capital, therefore, at least as far as this shortage is captured by the changes in
industry employment levels. At the same time, the results seem to suggest that the
same relationship can be mainly induced by “inside” effects, such as some rent-sharing
mechanisms or the monopsonistic power of employees that have accumulated the
firm’s specific human capital. The same analysis does not permit us to rule out the
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are captured by the industry dummies. This finding is actually quite plausible given
the Italian institutional setting, in which wage bargaining takes place largely at the
industry level. This does not contradict the main result of our analysis, however,
which shows how employment growth affects wages mainly through an establishment
effect and not through an industry effect.
As far as the other variables are concerned (Tables 2 and 3, columns 4, 5, and 6),
I find the expected signs of the coefficients. For both the entire sample of establish-
ments and for the smaller subset, an older labor force induces, on average, a rate of
wage growth that is smaller. This result is consistent with the generally accepted
finding that workers experience the largest wage growth during their youth. Finally,
the dummy variable that indicates the year 1983 is significantly negative for the entire
sample and very small and insignificant for the smaller subset of larger firms. These
results confirm the effects of the deep recession that hit Italy at the beginning of the
1980s, the largest losses of which (both in terms of employment and of labor earnings)
occurred in 1983 and 1984. The findings suggest that the smaller firms were more
deeply affected by this national economic crisis.
The Different Responses to Employment Growth in Expanding and Declining
Firms
So far I have shown that once I correct for the possible causes of composition bias,
I find some support for the prevailing role of “inside” effects in wage setting mecha-
nisms. In fact, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show a strong and significant
firm effect and an insignificant industry effect, as long as this effect is captured by the
changes in the employment level.
TABLE 4
Estimations of  Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ[Ln(wit/wit–1)]/n by Firm’s Employment Growth
Firms Categories: Employment Employment Employment
Growth > 0 Growth < 0 Growth ≥ –0.05
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.11 0.09 0.09
(4.8) (5.1) (5.7)
Ln (Firm’s Employmentt) 0.026 0.014 0.024
– Ln (Firm’s Employmentt–1) (1.4) (1.3) (1.8)
Ln (Industry’s Employmentt) –0.007 –0.017 –0.012
– Ln (Industry’s Employmentt–1) (–0.4) (–0.5) (–1.0)
Dummy for Year = 1983 –0.01 –0.021 –0.183
(–1.2) (–2.3) (–4.4)
(Average Aget of Firm’s Employees)/100 –0.27 –0.22 –0.007
(–4.2) (–3.8) (–1.1)
Number of Observations 548 787 1,261
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
The next part of the study examines whether this general positive relationship
differs among firms that are either expanding or declining. Table 4 presents the find-
ing. The results are presented for the sample containing all establishments. The analysis179 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
is conducted for three different cases: firms that were increasing in employment,
firms that were decreasing in employment, and firms that did not lose more than 5
percent of their employees (the national turnover rate during that period) over two
consecutive years.12
While the negative and insignificant effect of industry employment change is con-
firmed across all samples, the effect of the firm’s employment growth on wage changes
is positive for both expanding and declining firms. The coefficient of this regressor is
not significant at the 95 percent level, however. To gain insight about the direction of
the establishment effect, I calculated a Chow test on the parameter values of the
regressions conducted for expanding and contracting firms. For our data set contain-
ing all establishments, I could not reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients (Table
4, column 1 versus column 2), and this finding could suggest the existence of symme-
try in the role played by “inside” factors among expanding and declining firms.13
 An Analysis by Skill Level and Gender
Firms’ policies about wage setting can vary widely for different groups of workers.
This happens because different groups have different skill characteristics, but also
because of discriminatory practices and institutional forces. These factors can system-
atically affect the bargaining process between workers and employers. This was cer-
tainly the case in Italy, where a large fraction of individual wages were decided at a
centralized level when unions bargained with the employers’ confederation to set
wages for the different categories of workers.
TABLE 5
 Estimations of  Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ[Ln (wit/wit–1)] /na  for Different Categories of Employees
Firm’s Size > 15
Blue-Collar White-Collar
Men Women Workers Workers
Variablesa (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.06 0.5 0.07 0.10
(2.6) (3.1) (2.8) (4.3)
Ln (Firm’s Employmentt) 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04
– Ln (Firm’s Employmentt–1)a (2.1) (1.4) (2.3) (1.9)
Ln (Industry’s Employmentt) 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.04
– Ln (Industry’s Employmentt–1) (1.7) (0.6) (2.3) (0.5)
Dummy for year = 1983 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01
(1.0) (0.5) (0.88) (2.1)
(Average Aget of Firm’s Employees) /100a –0.17 –0.14 –0.18 –0.28
(–2.6) (–2.7) (–2.7) (–4.0)
Number of Observations 235 233 241 237
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
a. Both the dependent variable and the regressors are group specific.
This evidence suggests the need to explore how employment growth affects wage
growth by disaggregating the data among different job categories and between work-
ers of different gender. Table 5 illustrates the results of this analysis. The results are180 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
presented for the sample containing medium and large firms. The wage growth, the
employment growth, and the employees’ average age have been calculated for each
group of workers.
Table 5 shows, once again, that the average age of each single group has the
expected negative effect on wage growth, while the increase in the level of firms’
employment affects the wages of each group of workers positively and significantly.
This result is consistent across the different workers’ categories. Therefore, it seems
to be difficult to claim that “inside” factors exist because of the bargaining power of
those few workers that have accumulated the firm’s specific human capital. This analy-
sis shows that the wages of each group of workers within an establishment are respon-
sive to the firm’s expansion. Then, the findings seem more supportive of theories that
stress the role that some rent-sharing mechanisms can have in determining wages
within the firm.
The establishment’s effect is weaker only in the case of female workers (both in
terms of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and of the significance level).
This finding confirms previous results by Belzil [2000] and by Solon, Barsky, and Parker
[1994] in studies concerning real wage cyclicality. As an aggregate phenomenon, they
suggested that this result could be explained both by the fact that the cyclical shifts in
labor demand are smaller in the case of women, and by the possibility that women’s
short-run labor supply is more elastic. The insignificance of the coefficient that cap-
tures the industry effect in our analysis seems to confirm the second hypothesis. It
also suggests that women probably have much less bargaining power when it comes to
capturing some of the rents produced within their firm.
Finally, this step of the analysis also shows that blue-collar workers are the only
workers whose wages seemed to respond to changes in employment at the industry
level. This finding is difficult to interpret because the data do not permit me to distin-
guish different levels of employment growth among different categories of workers at
the industry level. This evidence is consistent, however, with the loss in bargaining
power that started to characterize Italian blue-collar workers in the early 1980s, as
the period of national solidarity was ending and the labor market was experiencing a
reopening of wage differentials. In this context, the last finding seems to confirm the
new labor market flexibility created by the Italian recession of early 1980s.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides evidence about the effect that employment growth has on real
wages, both at the firm level and the industry level. The analysis tries to cast some
light on those micro phenomena that affect the relationship between wages and aggre-
gate levels of employment, which is usually examined in studies dealing with real
wage cyclicality.
Overall, real wage growth is positively and significantly related with firm-level
employment growth, but not with industry-level employment growth. This result applies
to both expanding and declining firms. Wage changes do not seem to be caused by the
shortage of industry-specific human capital, therefore, as long as this shortage is cap-
tured by the changes in the industry’s employment level. Instead, this finding sug-
gests the prevailing role of “inside” effects. This could refer to a situation in which181 WAGE CHANGES, ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, COMPOSITION BIAS
wage changes occur because of the power gained by those employees who have accu-
mulated some firm-specific skills. The consistency of the establishment’s effect across
all the observed workers’ categories seems to be more supportive of other theories
that stress the importance of different rent-sharing mechanisms, however.
The study also shows that a composition bias can lead to incorrect conclusions in
the case of studies dealing with the relationship between aggregate wages and employ-
ment. The possibility of conducting an analysis at the establishment level has con-
firmed that it is likely to observe very different patterns of wage changes if different
aggregate measures of real wage growth are used. A first model was estimated by
using the firm’s average wage growth as the dependent variable and indicated a nega-
tive relationship between wages and employment. The same finding was reversed,
however, once the mean of individual wage changes was chosen as an alternative
aggregate statistic.
Finally, because these results refer to a period of employment decline and con-
flicts for Italian industrial relations, further studies should test their validity in the
context of some more recent years characterized by a more stable and increasingly
deregulated labor market.
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1. Also, the large body of evidence that has been collected on interindustry wage differentials has
usually been seen as a possible proof of the validity of these rent-sharing models. In particular, the
fact that high-wage industries pay higher wages across all job categories has been as a strong piece
of evidence of the existence of rents [Kruger and Summers, 1988; Dickens and Katz, 1987].
2. In their study about the earnings losses of high-tenure displaced workers, Jacobson, LaLonde and
Sullivan [1993], suggest that wage premiums are better explained by firm-specific skills or internal
labor markets than by industry-specific human capital accumulation.
3. For a review of studies about the asymmetry of “inside effects,” see Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
[1991]. The authors conclude that the evidence on this topic is quite inconclusive.
4. Unfortunately, both tax evasion and the existence of a large underground economy affect the
completeness of information obtainable with this data. de Luca and Bruni [1993] report that
“irregular wage workers” represented 9.5 percent of total job holders in Italy in 1980. Firms in the
underground economy ignore labor market regulations and therefore can adapt much more
quickly to market changes. The lack of records about these workers and their firms could then
downward bias my estimates of the relationship between wages and firm or industry employment
changes. The consequences of this problem should be limited, however, because historically the
underground economy has been more relevant in southern Italy while here I study records from
a northern city. Furthermore, my data include many small firms that by law were also exempted
from following labor laws.
5. It is also worth pointing out that, in this study, I measure the size of the firm from the total number
of individual workers’ records that I have for each year in correspondence of each firm ID. This
number is calculated by detecting the records on employees who have been excluded from the
analysis (because they were under the CIG system at different points in time), but whose real
wage changes qualify them again as regular employees at some different times. Consequently,
entries and exits from the CIG system were reconsidered to adjust and change the size of the
establishments for each year. The Pearson correlation coefficient between this new measure of
firm size and the corresponding original record of the data set was 0.945 (or 0.907 in terms of the182 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Spearman correlation coefficient). I have also deleted 2,121 individual observations corresponding
to workers for whom there were doubled records, and I have deleted 897 observations regarding
a firm whose change in employment over the three years was such that I have easily detected an
error in the data collection.
6. Unfortunately, as with other studies using social security data, I cannot distinguish directly between
quits and layoffs. Unlike in most such studies, however, I am able to use information about the
firm to detect the data of separations that are likely to result from layoffs or solely from quit
behavior. To do so, I detected the establishments whose growth rate of employment exceeded –5
percent in order to limit the number of separations due to layoffs included in the sample. To the
best of my knowledge, the only available study regarding quit rates in the Italian labor market
[Dell’Aringa, 1986] reports values of 6.6 percent and 5.5 percent for the quit rates in 1982 and 1983,
respectively. A similar methodology has been used previously by Galizzi and Lang [1998] and by
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan [1993] for the United States.
7. I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
8. It is possible to express some concerns on the validity of the following results on the basis of the
consideration that this data set does not permit us to control for the presence of hours. If overtime
hours were used, then higher monthly wages could just capture this phenomenon. By itself, this
critique could be dismissed by claiming that the hourly wage is not necessarily a statistic that is
superior to the one that measures the monthly wage. However, to infer the possible consequences
of this critique, I have checked the results by correcting the aggregate wage statistics by the
indexes of average yearly worked hours that are reported by the Italian labor statistics for the
three years that are the object of studies [ISTAT, 1986, 105]. Because the reported national
statistics only apply to the manufacturing sectors, and to the category of blue collar workers, I
have compared two set of results: some original results that I obtained for those subgroups of
workers, and a set of estimations that I derived using the group-specific aggregate wage measures
after they had been “corrected” on the basis of the hourly indexes. As far as the magnitude and the
significance level of the coefficient of the firm’s employment growth, I do not find any significant
difference between the two sets of findings.
9. I also estimated an additional model with the same dependent variable but only information about
the year and the changes in employment for the establishment and the industry. The results were
very similar to the ones that are reported in column 1.
10. I also tried to include a regressor indicating the percentage of workers who had changed their skill
level over the period. The results did not change. This additional regressor is not included in the
presented specification, however, because a detailed analysis of the individual data has suggested
that several of these changes indicate a downgrading of the worker’s qualification. This finding
complicates the interpretation of the role played by this additional independent variable.
11. This result is consistent with the findings of Weinberg [2001], who found a weak relationship
between industry employment growth and industry-level wages even after controlling for possible
composition bias.
12. The analysis that is presented in Tables 4 and 5 was also conducted with the two previously
discussed model specifications that include the industry dummies. I also found confirmation of the
jointly significant role played by these dummies; however, the inclusion of these regressors did not
change the results that are emphasized here, as far as firms’ and industries’ employment growths
are concerned.
13. The interpretation of these results is again complicated by the fact that, in the very small firms, a
small change in employment is reflected in very large percentage change.  Furthermore, the small
Italian firms were exempted from applying the Labor Laws. To account for these problems, I also
studied the case of establishments with more than 15 employees. Then, I found that the positive
effect of the firm’s employment growth was only confirmed among the declining firms. The very
small and different sizes of these subsamples (84 versus 153 observations for the growing and
declining firms, respectively) did not permit me to draw conclusions about this additional finding,
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